Asian cultural heritage was researched and preserved, but also how it was reinvented in national terms and codified; and how these processes were negotiated between local intellectuals, scholars and the state.
Introduction
This issue of Iranian Studies focuses on the Persian-speaking world through Russian eyes. Asia, Russia's image of Muslim culture had been significantly influenced by contact with its Tatar minority. Tsarist Russia often interacted with Central Asia with the help of its Tatar subjects, who were valued translators in this mainly Turkic speaking part of the world. 1 The fact that the Russians did not have a sufficient number of ready-made Persian-language translators almost certainly led to a decline in the official use of Persian; the local population had to address their petitions to the Russian authorities in Turkic if they were to be translated. 2 In addition to that, Kazan, the home of a sizeable Tatar population, had been the leading center of Russian Oriental studies before 1855, when St. Petersburg took its place. 3 When the greater part of Russian-ruled Central Asia under was made a separate GovernorGeneralship in 1867, it was tellingly called Turkestan (in accordance with the toponym Turkestān [Persian for "the land of the Turks"], under which the area north and east of Mā warāʾ al-nahr [Arabic for "land beyond the river"] had already been known to Arab geographers of the ninth and tenth centuries). 4 After the 1917 revolution there were initially few signs that a Persian state would be established in Soviet Asia. For instance, in 1921-1922 the People's Commissariat of Nationalities of Turkestan (Turkkomnats) was made up of national departments for the Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Uzbeks; Tajiks fell under the category of "national minorities." Of the sixty newspapers published by Turkkomnats in local languages, not a single one was in Tajik. 5 As late as 1923, Stalin failed to mention Tajiks when speaking about the nationalities of Bukhara at the twelfth party congress. 6 Similarly, the constitution of among Central Asia's educated elites, since it was widely regarded as scientific and objective. For instance, Vera Tolz stressed that although "Orientological knowledge … constituted 'an important part of the colonial project of control and command,'" it was often appropriated by nationalists among the colonized peoples. This might seem somewhat puzzling at first, but she explains that such knowledge was often perceived not as colonizing, but that it was "widely viewed as objective science and could therefore be accepted as such by the colonized peoples." 10 The prestige and expertise of Orientalist scholarship was also an important factor in forging what Francine Hirsch has termed a "revolutionary alliance" of former imperial scholars and the Bolshevik government, whose shared "appreciation for the potential of scientific government … and interest in the nationality question … shaped the very formation of the Soviet Union." 11 12 According to Lisa Yountchi, Ol'denburg was a particularly active supporter of the establishment of a branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Tajikistan. 13 His awareness of the matter was almost certainly raised through his correspondence with Aleksandr Semenov between 1918 and 1930, in particular on the subject of Ismaili manuscripts. 14 Adeeb Khalid, Vera Tolz, Francine Hirsch and Yuri Slezkine all stressed that Jadids, Bolsheviks and imperial Orientalists all shared a belief in the scientific and objective existence of nations and ethnic groups, and in the possibility of influencing their self-awareness. 15 Their cooperation was therefore more probable than one would initially assume. Moreover, as Michael Kemper has emphasized, the Soviet government attached "outstanding political importance" to the field of Oriental studies. 16 Academics were invited to bring their expertise on a relatively obscure region into an alliance with the government, which in turn offered monetary rewards, promotion and entirely new careers to its contractors. As a result, the early Soviet state service was characterized by a significant degree of penetrability for tsarist Orientalist scholars such as Nikolai Marr, Vasilii Bartol´d or Aleksandr Semenov, 17 whose influence was henceforth stronger than it had been before the revolution. In the tsarist period, the protests of prominent scholars had often been ignored, for instance in the case of the demise of the ethnonym Sart despite Bartol'd's opposition. 18 At the same time, Semenov's remarkable career in the tsarist colonial administration illustrates the high degree of "interpenetration of the worlds of scholarship and colonial rule" before the revolution. 19 The closer the alliance between government officials and scholars was, the more weight the choices made by these scholars on questions of nationality or border delimitation carried. The data provided by Oriental scholars played a key role in arbitrating controversial questions linked to the national-territorial delimitation in the region. Adrienne Edgar has argued that while in theory Soviet ideology emphasized popular demand as the decisive factor in questions of national-territorial delimitation, in practice ethnographic criteria together with the voices of local communist leaders were often more crucial. 20 21 -consulted the works of Russian Orientalists. 22 In addition, the scholars' familiarity with the local languages, customs and history often earned them respect among the local population. This respect could, however, go hand in hand with a degree of suspicion from local Russians, as illustrated by the following account by Nadezhda Fioletova, 
A Nation Promoted by Orientalists?
At the same time, we should not exaggerate the influence of Russian Orientalists on the emergence of a predominately Persian-speaking Soviet republic. The rationale and goals of the Bolshevik nationalities policy, which among other things led to the emergence of Tajikistan, are manifold. In his study on the establishment of national republics in Soviet Central Asia, Arne Haugen has argued that earlier scholarship on the topic had tended to emphasize the tactical and Machiavellian nature of Moscow's policies aimed at securing its grip on Central Asia. 27 Such interpretative framework is prone to stress the artificiality and modern origins of the Central Asian Soviet Republics. 28 Later scholarship has taken Soviet ideology more seriously and stressed the push for modernization and societal transformation.
This school of thought has paid more attention to the part played by Central Asian actors in the emergence of the Soviet republics. It also highlighted that fact that some features of the Soviet national culture and national identity models had not been created from scratch during the Soviet period; to some extent they reflected the pre-existing identities and historical divisions. Haugen writes:
"It is a main argument in this study that the nationalization of political discourse and ultimately the entities that were established as a result of the delimitation process to a great degree corresponded to historical divisions and formations in Central Asian historiography, national ideology, and perhaps even identity up until today. 31 In the case of Tajikistan this heritage was significantly shaped by scholars such as Aleksandr Semenov, whose vision of the history and identity of the Tajiks I will outline in the following.
When in 1924-the year that the Republic of Tajikistan was first established-Semenov's article "On the national delimitation of Central Asia" appeared in print in Tashkent, it was part of the very processes it described. Published during the formative years of the Bolshevik nationalities policy, the article must have been met with great interest among intellectuals in Central Asia. Given the resources at stake for ambitious representatives of the future "titular" nationalities, for many the question of national territorial delimitation was far from academic.
Central Asian Communist party leaders and intellectuals in particular came to regard their nationality as a potential asset in the contest for jobs in government, academia, and the cultural or health sector. 32 Semenov's article provided some of the academic arguments the Tajik republic's proponents could use in order to achieve their goals. Francine Hirsch has shown that Tajik communists readily quoted Russian Orientalists in their urge to establish a Tajik republic, e.g. in their appeals to the Peters commission-a body set up by the Communist Party in late 1929 to settle border disputes between the Tajik and Uzbek SSRs.
She noted that "Tajik leaders … cited from Bartol'd's works to argue that the Tajiks were descendants of Iranian tribes that were indigenous to contested parts of Uzbekistan." 33 And Paul Bergne, in his pioneering study The Birth of Tajikistan, even argued that the Tajiks were initially a nation promoted by Orientalists. As Central Asian intellectuals-often equally fluent in Turkic and Persian-who could have potentially promoted Tajik nationalism had "fallen under the spell" of Turkism, it was "Russian scholars who took up the cause of the Tajik nation." Bergne further wrote: "When in 1924, the Soviet government decided on the 'National Territorial Delimitation,' it was exclusively Russian 'orientalists' who contributed to the exhaustive study of the Tajiks 'ethnie.'" 34 Similarly, Sergei Abashin noted that between 1926 and 1929, when Tajik intellectuals were extensively lobbying for a more independent "Greater Tajikistan," "the arguments of the Tajik lobbyists were mainly based on the issues of language, culture and history" taken from works such as Bartol'd's Tajiks-A historical outline, and from the volumes Tadzhikistan and Po Tadzhikistanu, published by Mikhael Andreev and Aleksandr Semenov in 1925. 35 The above-mentioned papers were published by the Society for the Study of Tajikistan and the Iranian Peoples Beyond its Borders, founded in the same year and with Semenov among its members. 36 
Turk and Tajik
In terms of its scholarly content, Semenov's article "On the national delimitation of Central Asia" followed Vasilii Bartol'd's "History of Turkestan" published in 1922. 37 Semenov quoted whole passages from Bartol'd's work without attribution. This should, however, not be mistaken for carelessness-Semenov's referencing in his other works is impeccable.
Rather, the complete lack of any references in the whole article reflects its purpose: it was not to motivate further reading, but to help "economists-researchers, sociologists and the organs of administration" 38 to gain a quick basic understanding of the origins and nature of the ethnic mosaic of Turkestan. Consequently, the fourteen-page article contains only a short historical background on Central Asia since antiquity, and an outline of the region's prevalent religions, cultures, languages and peoples, with some information about various ruling dynasties. As the title suggests, the spotlight is on the peoples of Central Asia, which are referred to by Semenov either as nationalities (narodnosti) if settled, or as tribes if nomadic.
However, the message transcending the article's thicket of empirical information is roughly this: this country may be called Turkestan, and it was until recently ruled by Turks; but let us not forget that it is an ancient homeland of Iranians, 39 whose culture and language was at the very least as decisive a factor in its history.
In addition, the article creates an almost clear-cut dichotomy between the notions of sedentariness, Iranianness and high culture, on the one hand, and nomadism, Turkicness (or Mongolicness) and relative primitivism on the other. Semenov, for instance, refers to the Persian myth about Fereydun to argue that the Turāniāns of the Shāhnāmeh are not Turkic, and that there is no "Turāniān race." 40 Later he emphasizes that the usage of the term "Turkestan (the land of the Turks)" became widespread only during the reign of the Seljuq (Saljuqiān) dynasty; and that the Turkification of Central Asia gained momentum only in the centuries after the fall of the Samanids (Sāmāniān). 41 with the Aryan theme in nineteenth century Russia (and Europe), which, according to Marlène Laruelle, had the double-purpose of providing the Russians with a link to an IndoIranian "Aryan" ancestry in the ancient Orient and justifying the latter's imperial "reconquest." 50 It was, however, most likely also a message that he wanted to deliver to the "organs of administration" to which his 1924 article was addressed.
The Benefits and Pitfalls of Seeking Legitimacy in (Persian) History
In his short autobiography, the Bukharan poet Sadriddin Ayni claimed that not only was there little support for a Tajik state in Central Asia during the 1920s, the idea even faced outright opposition. 51 Specimen of Tajik literature-a book that (like Semenov's article) had not only a scholarly but also a political dimension. 53 In a nutshell, Ayni's argument was that where there was Tajik literature there also had to be a Tajik people. When the book was published in Moscow in 1926, wrote Ayni, his opponents started using "red phraseology" and attacked the publication because it featured an allegedly reactionary poem by the Persian poet Rudaki.
Eventually, regardless of the efforts of "Russian Orientalists who defended the book and opposed its removal," Ayni's work was eventually withdrawn and destroyed in 1930. 54 Aleksandr Semenov was probably among those defending it. After all, he was a member "It is necessary to stand up for the right of the Tajiks to their ancient native art; particularly when taking into account the future struggle for cultural-political influence in the East among the Persianspeaking countries. This means: in Iran, Afghanistan, and to a certain (significant) extent in India. In all these places, one can assume, the Tajik anthology will find its readers." 55 As this quote suggests, Znamenskii was a leading and high-ranking advocate for the promotion of Tajik language and culture within the USSR in view of heightening its prestige abroad. 56 Research Institute. 61 The dictionary was a continuation of the projects that Semenov had been working on since 1927, when the Tajik authorities asked him and 'Abd al-ra'uf Fetrat ('Abdalrauf Fitrat) to submit proposals for the introduction of the Latin script in the country. 62 In the same year Semenov advised the Central Committee of the New Tajik Alphabet at the Central Executive Committee of the Tajik ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) in Samarkand on issues such as "the phonetic and morphologic particularities of the Tajik language" or "the meaning of the new alphabet for the Iranian peoples of Persia, India and Afghanistan"-which, as he was told by the above-mentioned committee, would better be limited to the Tajiks at that moment in time. 63 In late August 1930, only a few months before his arrest, Semenov chaired the decisive Linguistic Conference on the creation of a modern Soviet Tajik language in Stalinabad. 64 His conclusion followed what appears to have been the dominant opinion in the republic at that time: one should refrain from too drastic a reinvention of the language, it should remain close to the language of the contemporary Tajik press and literature and intelligible by all Tajik speakers in the USSR. 65 It seems fair to say that such work significantly shaped contemporary Tajik culture, on the one hand furthering its Sovietization and Russification, while on the other hand safeguarding a considerable degree of historical authenticity and continuity by preventing an even more drastic break with its Irano-Islamic past. It also, crucially, provided a much-needed income for the sacked professor and quite possibly also protection from more and in 1941 he promoted Ghafurov to that very position. 69 At that time Ghafurov started to work on his dissertation "History of the Ismaili sect from the beginning of the nineteenth century until the first imperialist war." His research was supervised by a Moscow Orientalist ,Evgenii Beliaev, but it seems it was Aleksandr Semenov who encouraged Ghafurov to write on that topic-he may have hoped to win the promising young man for a career in academia. 70 We know for certain that Ghafurov was keen to mobilize Semenov's academic skills and prestige to help produce the two-volume History of the Tajiks and Tajikistan. On Judging by the tone of the letter, Semenov did not have much choice. However, the German invasion of the USSR delayed the publication of the History of the Tajiks and of Tajikistana book that was evidently of at least as much political relevance as it was of academic interest. Semenov, rather than travelling to Stalinabad to furnish Tajiks with patriotic historiography, was kept busy in Tashkent during the months that followed; he received academics (including many leading Orientalists) who had been evacuated from all parts of the Soviet Union to the "city of bread," as Tashkent was known since the publication of Aleksandr Neverov's novel of the same title in 1923. 72 As a result, it was not until after the war that the ambitious project was, to at least some extent, realized by Bobojon Ghafurov himself, who published his A Short History of the Tajik People in 1947. 73 In his review of the work, Semenov praised the author's "gratifying attempt to give a connected representation of the destinies of the Tajik people from the very beginning up to our days." 74 He acknowledged the teleological character of this narrative and that it was written, "so to say, from the viewpoint of the Tajiks [?] ." 75 But Semenov ventured more overt criticism, too. For instance, he saw Ghafurov's differentiation between a "local Iranian and a Tajik aristocracy" during the Samanid period as artificial; he was uncomfortable with the disassociation of Tajik and Iranian history in the tenth century simply because in the twentieth these terms had come to signify two different nations. In the same vein, Semenov maintained that Tajik history could only include poets such as Saadi and Hafiz-who were "close and related to the Tajik people" but lived in "Central Persia, India and Turkey"-if it incorporated many others, too.
He concluded that "for the sake of accuracy of the historical picture" matters of prime importance should not take a back seat to those of lesser gravity. 76 Ghafurov did not take the criticism personally (besides, many more revised editions of his book were to appear). A few years later, in the spring of 1946, another congratulatory letter reached Semenov, who had just been awarded the honorary title "Distinguished Figure of Tajik Science." The letter was written by Bobojon Ghafurov, then the second secretary of the Tajik Communist Party's Central Committee, who was five months away from being promoted to the post of first secretary, which he held until 1956. 77 Semenov could not have been given the above award without Ghafurov's support-it probably happened on the latter's own initiative. The letter speaks of Semenov as rightfully belonging to the Tajik people, whose culture and history he had spent half his life researching. 78 Interestingly, Ghafurov expressed a lack of understanding for his friend's unwillingness to move to Tajikistan and asked him to visit Stalinabad "possibly in spring, spring is good in Stalinabad!" As mentioned above, five years later Semenov did indeed accept the invitation to lead the Tajik academy's Institute for History, Archaeology and Ethnography. 79 Semenov's student Ahror Mukhtorov reported that once the expelled professor had arrived in Stalinabad, Ghafurov took great care of him-he was elected member of the republic's Academy of Sciences and deputy of the Tajik Supreme Soviet. In addition to the privileges that came with these roles, Semenov was given an apartment within walking distance from his workplace, where electricity was never cut off, a car and access to cheap quality food through a government shop. 80 Moreover, Mukhtorov maintained that Ghafurov had received the green light, from Stalin personally, to provide a harbor for scholars who, in Ghafurov's words, were "caught up in the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign" but who "had brought great benefit to science" and could continue to do so. 81 Once Ghafurov's political authority had surpassed that of Semenov, nothing kept him from lecturing the eminent academic on the way history should be interpreted. In 1949 he wrote races." 83 
Conclusion
Regardless of whether one regards Tajikistan as the reincarnation of an ancient nation (as the official Tajik national ideology asserts today) or emphasizes its modern roots, without paying attention to the networks of Central Asian intellectuals and Russian Orientalists and their interaction with the state during the first half of the twentieth century, one runs the risk of overestimating either of the two viewpoints. On the one hand, the writings of some Russian
Orientalists convey a sense of the antiquity and wealth of the languages, cultures and identities in Central Asia. On the other, the traces of censorship and ideology within those very works, and the great personal risk to which their authors were often exposed, remind us how far from objective and how fit for political purpose their work often was. An analysis of the networks connecting those scholars with other local intellectuals illustrates that knowledge about "the Orient" was not only produced-in Saidian terms-to rule the "Orientals," but that it was also appropriated by Central Asians in order to gain access to resources, recognition and power. People like Ghafurov not only managed to refashion former Russian scholarship to serve their own purposes, but they surpassed their former mentors in influence and status, often at the price of significant Sovietization and Russification. The study of such networks shows how Central Asian cultural heritage was researched and preserved, but also how it was reinvented and codified in national terms and how these processes were negotiated between local intellectuals, scholars and the state.
